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Restraining Judicial Application of the “Safe 
Harbor” Provision in the Electoral Count Act 
DEREK T. MULLER* 
The Electoral Count Act of 1887, as codified in part at 3 U.S.C. § 5, 
includes a “safe harbor” for states to resolve disputes in their choices of 
presidential electors. Congress will treat as “conclusive” a 
“determination” about “any controversy or contest concerning the 
appointment” of presidential electors, if that determination is made “at 
least six days” before the time the electors are to meet. This is a rule 
governing how Congress handles “the counting of electoral votes as 
provided in the Constitution.”1  
It is not a judicially-enforceable rule for courts to heed. And it is a 
rule that state legislature may, not must, heed. 
In the aftermath of Bush v. Gore, however, federal courts have 
wrongly construed the “safe harbor” as a timing mandate placed upon 
courts. A proper understanding of the “safe harbor,” rightly understood 
through Bush v. Gore, reserves its influence to Congress and, 
occasionally, to state legislatures. Federal courts should take heed in the 
event of closely contested elections or recounts in the 2020 presidential 
election and beyond. 
* * * 
In 2000, presidential electors were scheduled to meet and vote in their 
respective states on December 18. That meant the “safe harbor” deadline 
to choose presidential electors under 3 U.S.C. § 5 was December 12. 
Litigation proceeded rapidly across Florida, but the major case that would 
become Bush v. Gore reached the Florida Supreme Court as Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Board v. Harris. Early briefing from both Vice 
President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush focused on December 
18 as the presumptive deadline. But Secretary of State Katherine Harris 
filed a brief with the Florida Supreme Court explaining that “[t]he 
Legislature had good reasons to set strict time limits for the certification 
of elections,” specifically citing the safe harbor of 3 U.S.C. § 5 as one 
such reason. 
The Florida Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 20, 
2000. The justices repeatedly referred to December 12 as a date that 
might put “Florida’s votes in jeopardy.” In a filing immediately after the 




hearing, the Bush campaign seized on the December 12 date as placing 
Florida at “risk of not having is electors participate.” 
On November 21, the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris. It scrutinized the state 
constitution and state law concerning the Secretary of State’s authority:  
Ignoring the county’s returns is a drastic measure and is appropriate only if the 
returns are submitted to the Department so late that their inclusion will 
compromise the integrity of the electoral process in either of two ways: (1) by 
precluding a candidate, elector, or taxpayer from contesting the certification of 
an election pursuant to section 102.168; or (2) by precluding Florida voters 
from participating fully in the federal electoral process.  
“Precluding Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral 
process” appears here for the first time, with a footnote citation, “See 3 
U.S.C. §§ 1-10.” 
The Florida Supreme Court later restated this rule, tethered more 
obviously to Florida law: “We conclude that, consistent with the Florida 
election scheme, the Secretary may reject a Board’s amended returns only 
if the returns are submitted so late that their inclusion will preclude a 
candidate from contesting the certification or preclude Florida’s voters 
from participating fully in the federal electoral process.” (emphasis 
added). 
The United States Supreme Court highlighted this language—and the 
preferences of the state legislature in particular—in its unanimous per 
curiam decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board:  
the state legislature has provided for final determination of contests or 
controversies by a law made prior to election day, that determination shall be 
conclusive if made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors. 
The Florida Supreme Court cited 3 U.S.C. § 1-10 in a footnote of its 
opinion . . . but did not discuss § 5. Since § 5 contains a principle of federal 
law that would assure finality of the State’s determination if made pursuant to 
a state law in effect before the election, a legislative wish to take advantage of 
the ‘safe harbor’ would counsel against any construction of the Election Code 
that Congress might deem to be a change in the law. 
The Court added, “We are also unclear as to the consideration the 
Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C. § 5.” Describing § 5 as a 
“principle of federal law” is a noteworthy characterization, suggesting the 
Court recognized a “principle” was not necessarily binding on courts or 
states. 




On remand in Gore v. Harris, the Florida Supreme Court noted, “We 
consider these statutes cognizant of the federal grant of authority derived 
from the United States Constitution and derived from 3 U.S.C. § 5 . . . .” 
Nevertheless, the case “is controlled by the language set forth by the 
Legislature” in statutes. Justice Harding’s dissent likewise explained in a 
footnote, “There is no legislative suggestion that the Florida Legislature 
did not want to take advantage of this safe harbor provision.” 
At oral argument before the Supreme Court on December 11, Justice 
Souter emphasized that the safe harbor was “for the guidance of 
Congress.” Later, when Harris’s attorney mentioned the December 12 
deadline, Justice Souter again emphasized that it was a “federal” safe 
harbor, to which counsel responded that the United States Supreme Court 
had identified “there was a desire and a wish by the legislature to preserve 
the safe harbor,” which, Justice Scalia pointed out, “the Florida court 
accepted.” 
On December 12—the safe harbor date—the Supreme Court issued 
its decision in Bush v. Gore. For the per curiam majority, according the 
Florida Supreme Court, “the legislature intended the State’s electors to 
‘participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,’ as provided in 3 
U.S.C. § 5.” That’s a gloss on Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris as interpreted in Gore v. Harris. “[T]he Florida Supreme Court 
has said that the Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor 
benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5,” which meant further delays in the recount would 
be “in violation of the Florida Election Code.” The concurring opinion 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist followed the same path: the safe harbor 
“informs” application of the Constitution’s grant of power to the state 
“Legislature,” “which, as the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged, took 
that statute into account.”2 
The dissenting justices also recognized the “safe harbor” did not 
independently constrain Florida. Justice Stevens noted that Congress “did 
not impose any affirmative duties” on states with the safe harbor. Justice 
Souter noted that the safe harbor only operated as a date for the conclusive 
congressional recognition of electors in the event of a dispute, and 
“determination is to be made, if made anywhere, in the Congress” about 
how to handle electors selected before or after the safe harbor deadline. 
Justices Ginsburg3 and Breyer had a similar understanding. And Justice 
Breyer went farther, arguing, “Nowhere in Bush I did we establish that 
this Court had the authority to enforce § 5.” 
In short, every justice took a similar approach to 3 U.S.C. § 5, albeit 
by different routes. Some emphasized that the Florida Supreme Court 




understood Florida law to seek to take advantage of the “safe harbor” 
deadline. Others noted that § 5 is a rule for Congress to handle the 
treatment of electors. But no justice said it was an independent mandate 
upon federal courts, and no justice said that it was a mandate placed upon 
states absent some state legislative intent.4 
* * * 
Since Bush v. Gore, however, and stripped of its context, the “safe 
harbor” has been invoked by lower courts to insist on recount deadlines. 
In 2016, for instance, Green Party candidate Jill Stein pressed for 
recounts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania after the election. In 
a lawsuit in Michigan, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “Federal law requires 
that all disputes over a state’s delegation to the Electoral College be 
resolved by December 13, 2016.”5 But, as noted, federal law requires no 
such thing. 
In parallel litigation in Pennsylvania, a district court held, “[G]ranting 
the relief Plaintiffs seek would make it impossible for the Commonwealth 
to certify its Presidential Electors by December 13 (as required by federal 
law).” It continued, “Pennsylvania has opted into the federal ‘safe harbor’ 
that allows it to determine conclusively its Presidential Electors through 
state procedures.” But the federal district court made no finding like the 
Florida Supreme Court in 2000—that the state legislature was 
“cognizant” of these laws when constructing recount deadlines. 
Candidates seeking recounts will always want the later deadline, and 
candidates resisting them the earlier. But courts examining presidential 
election recount deadlines should be more careful. The “safe harbor” 
deadline is not a federal requirement placed upon states. It is a rule for 
Congress when counting electoral votes. True, it provides a benefit to 
states that meet the deadline. And in the Bush v. Gore litigation, the 
Florida Supreme Court expressly concluded that the state legislature 
intended to meet that “safe harbor” deadline for any recounts. But 
independent of an express finding that a state statute incorporates the 
“safe harbor” deadline, it would be a mistake for courts to add timing 
requirements to state laws in presidential election recounts. 
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